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INTRODUCTION
A pregnant woman enters a hospital after experiencing complica-
tions in the very beginning of her third trimester. She has two young
children at home. The attending physician at the hospital is not her regu-
lar doctor. But, this attending physician decides that she cannot leave the
hospital. The physician orders medication, supervision of her diet,
restriction of her movement, and a cesarean section.'
The woman is sensitive to the risks to the fetus. But, she has two
young children and her own doctor. She agrees to rest, but wants to go
home and wants the opinion of another doctor. The attending physician
informs her that she cannot leave. He initiates formal legal proceedings
to confine her to his hospital and to perform a cesarean section.2
The hospital contacts the state attorney, who appoints the hospital's
retained lawyer as counsel.3 A judge and the hospital's attorney hold a
special hearing over the phone to determine the woman's fate.4 The hos-
pital presents the doctor's expert opinion that the fetus is at a "substan-
tial and unacceptable" risk of severe injury if the woman does not follow
his exact orders.' The woman explains that she opposes forced super-
vised bed rest here and requests to change hospitals.6 She wants to
decide which doctor will help her deliver the child, where she will rest
for possibly the next three months until the fetus is born, and who will
care for her two young children at home. The State speaks through a
medical doctor and attorney.7 The pregnant woman must speak on her
own behalf to explain that she wishes to have a say in how she brings a
child into the world. The judge finds for the State.8
The court orders the woman to follow all of the physician's orders:
"including but not limited to" bed rest, medication to postpone labor and
prevent infection, and, when needed, a cesarean section.9 This order has
no expiration, even in the case of birth or loss of the fetus. 10 A few days
later, the fetus is stillborn.'1 The judge does not terminate the order con-
fining the woman in the hospital until a day after the fetus was
1. Kate Wevers, Recent Development, Burton v. Florida: Maternal Fetal Conflicts and
Medical Decision-Making During Pregnancy, 38 J. L. MED. & ETHics 436, 436-37 (2010).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 437.
4. Id.
5. Burton v. State, 49 So. 3d 263, 264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
6. Wevers, supra note 1, at 436.
7. Id.
8. Burton, 49 So. 3d at 264.
9. Id.; Wevers, supra note 1, at 437 (The cesarean section occurred a few days after the
woman had been confined in the hospital pursuant to the judicial order.).
10. Wevers, supra note 1, at 436.




This judicial order compelling involuntary medical treatment that
ultimately culminated in a stillborn fetus left many unanswered ques-
tions. Who would care for Ms. Burton's two other young children while
she was forced to remain in the hospital? How great was the risk of
severe injury to the fetus if Ms. Burton returned home? Was the fetus
viable as to permit the State to intervene? Was the fetus likely to survive
if the forced treatment was completed? Was survival nearly impossible
regardless of additional actions taken? Did the judicial order leave Ms.
Burton to the whims of an experienced obstetrician or a young emer-
gency room physician?
Despite an explicit right to privacy in the Florida Constitution, 13 a
right which the Supreme Court of Florida has interpreted to include the
right to refuse medical treatment,' 4 lower and reviewing courts in Flor-
ida continuously fail to protect a pregnant woman's right to refuse medi-
cal treatment. Lower courts use incorrect legal tests despite explicit
precedent. Reviewing courts misapply doctrinal tests, ignore merits of
individual cases, and attempt to use mootness to avoid addressing these
cases. Further, the State appoints private attorneys specialized in medi-
cal litigation to represent it. In contrast, pregnant women are left without
any representation.
Part I of this article describes the right to refuse medical treatment
under the United States Constitution and the broader protection afforded
by Florida's Constitution. Part II illustrates how the State can overcome
a person's right to refuse medical treatment. Part III explains Florida
courts' various failures to adequately protect the rights of pregnant
women, including the doctrinal failure to apply strict scrutiny, the weak
appellate review of these cases, and the failure to provide counsel
despite an obligation to do so. Part IV discusses suggestions and recom-
mendations to better protect the rights of pregnant women. Part V con-
cludes that when it comes to pregnant women and medical decision-
making, Florida courts ignore the law. The consequences of such a fail-
ure may extend well beyond a pregnant woman's right to refuse medical
treatment.
12. Id. at 437.
13. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 ("Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into the person's private life .... ").
14. State v. Herbert (In re Browning), 568 So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1990) ("Recognizing that one
has the inherent right to make choices about medical treatment, we necessarily conclude that this
right encompasses all medical choices.").
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I. THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT
The federal and Florida constitutions both protect the right to pri-
vacy. 5 Binding interpretations of each recognize that the right to pri-
vacy includes the right to refuse medical treatment. 16
A. Federal Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
The federal right to refuse medical treatment has its origins in the
common law.1 7 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to include a right to
privacy which protects persons from interference with their reproductive
choices and from unwanted medical treatment.' 8
1. COMMON LAW ORIGINS
The common law doctrine of informed consent 19 protects individu-
als from involuntary medical treatment.2 0 Informed consent "encom-
passes a right to informed refusal."'" Thus, a doctor who performs
medical treatment without obtaining informed consent may be guilty of
battery or liable for negligence.22 The United States Supreme Court has
recognized the importance of this common law right stating, "[n]o right
is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by
15. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) ("[T]he right to privacy which presses
for recognition here is a legitimate one."); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 151 (1973) ("[T]he Court
has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy,
does exist under the Constitution."); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 ("Every natural person has the right
to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life .... ").
16. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) ("[A] competent person
has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment .... ");
State v. Herbert (In re Browning), 568 So. 2d 4, 11 (Fla. 1990) ("A competent person has the
constitutional right to choose or refuse medical treatment, and that right extends to all relevant
decisions concerning one's health.").
17. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1890).
18. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
19. State v. Presidential Women's Ctr., 937 So. 2d 114, 115 (Fla. 2006) ("Under the doctrine
of informed consent, a physician has an obligation to advise his or her patient of the material risks
of undergoing a medical procedure."); Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n., 191 Conn. 282, 289
(1983) ("[A] surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent, commits an
assault, for which he is liable in damages.") (internal citations omitted).
20. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc) ("Under the doctrine of
informed consent, a physician must inform the patient 'at a minimum' of 'the nature of the
proposed treatment, any alternative treatment procedures, and the nature and degree of risks and
benefits inherent in undergoing and in abstaining from the proposed treatment.' ") (citing Crain v.
Allison, 443 A.2d 558, 561-62 (D.C. 1982)).




clear and unquestionable authority of law."23
The common law also recognizes the right to refuse medical proce-
dures that would benefit another.24 This is akin to the common law rec-
ognition that there is no duty to rescue another person in most
circumstances 25:
The common law has consistently held to a rule which provides that
one human being is under no legal compulsion to give aid or to take
action to save another human being or to rescue .... For our law to
compel defendant to submit to an intrusion to his body would change
every concept and principle upon which our society is founded. To do
so would defeat the sanctity of the individual, and would impose a
rule which would know no limits, and one could not imagine where
the line would be drawn.26
2. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Although the United States Constitution does not contain an
explicit right to privacy, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as guaranteeing a right to
privacy dating back to 1890.27
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court recognized that a
right to privacy exists specifically in a marital and reproductive setting
and is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.28 In 1973, the
Supreme Court held that prohibiting abortion, and thereby preventing
women from exercising control of their own bodies, violated that right to
privacy. 9 The Court noted, however, that it was not an absolute right
and that the State could override a woman's right to privacy to protect a
compelling state interest-namely, a viable third-trimester fetus.30
The Due Process Clause's right to privacy includes the right to
refuse medical treatment.31 In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
of Health, the Court addressed whether a person has the right to refuse
food and care that will result in that person's death. 32 The Court reiter-
ated the common law origin of the right, citing Justice Cardozo's state-
ment that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a
23. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 141 U.S. at 251.
24. In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1243-44.
25. Erin P. Davenport, Court Ordered Cesarean Sections: Why Courts Should Not Be
Allowed to Use a Balancing Test, 18 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 79, 98 (2010).
26. McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C. 3d 90, 91 (Allegheny Cnty. Ct. 1978).
27. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 141 U.S. at 251.
28. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
29. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
30. Id. at 163-64.
31. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
32. Id. at 267-68.
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right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon
who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an
assault .. . ."" Although the right is not without its limits, the Court
nonetheless held, "[A] competent person has a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment .... -31
B. Florida's Broader Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
Unlike the United States Constitution, the Florida Constitution con-
tains an explicit right to privacy.35 Article 1, section 23 states, "[e]very
natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental
intrusion into the person's private life ....
The Florida Supreme Court held that this explicit right to privacy is
broader and "embraces more privacy interests, and extends more protec-
tion to the individual in those interests, than does the federal Constitu-
tion."37 Like the United States Supreme Court, the Florida Supreme
Court recognized that the right to privacy included an individual's right
to refuse medical treatment.38 Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court stated,
"[r]ecognizing that one has the inherent right to make choices about
medical treatment, we necessarily conclude that this right encompasses
all medical choices.
Florida's right to privacy also protects a woman's ability to make
her own reproductive choices free from governmental intrusion. 0 While
addressing the unconstitutionality of preventing minors from having
abortions without parental knowledge or consent, the Florida Supreme
Court explained the important and personal nature of reproductive
choices and why the right to privacy protects them:
Of all decisions a person makes about his or her body, the most
profound and intimate relate to two sets of ultimate questions, first,
whether, when, and how one's body is to become the vehicle for
33. Id. at 269 (citing Schloendorg v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30 (1914)).
34. Id. at 278.
35. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
36. Id.
37. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989) (holding that although procedures for
parental notification in the case of a minor seeking an abortion may be permissible under the
United States Constitution, they were not necessarily permissible under Florida's constitution); N.
Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612, 636 (Fla. 2003) ("In
adopting the privacy amendment, Floridians deliberately opted for substantially more protection
than the federal charter provides.").
38. State v. Herbert (In re Browning), 568 So. 2d 4, 11 (Fla. 1990) ("A competent person has
the constitutional right to choose or refuse medical treatment, and that right extends to all relevant
decisions concerning one's health."); In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 822 (Fla. 1993) (holding that
the state has a duty to ensure that a person's desire to refuse medical treatment is honored).
39. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 10.
40. T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1192.
1044 [Vol. 67:1039
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another human being's creation; second, when and how-this time
there is no question of "whether"-one's body is to terminate its
organic life.41
Although the decision to bring another human into the world is one of
the most important choices a person can make, pregnancy and mother-
hood do not defeat an individual's right to control her own body.42 The
Florida Supreme Court has held that a woman does not forfeit her funda-
mental rights to liberty and privacy by becoming a mother.43 In In re
Dubreuil, the State argued that the mother and custodial parent of two
young children could not refuse a life-saving blood transfusion because
her children would be abandoned.44 Finding for the woman, the Court
concluded, "Parenthood, in and of itself, does not deprive one of living
in accord with one's own beliefs. Society does not, for example, dispar-
age or preclude one from performing an act of bravery resulting in the
loss of that person's life simply because that person has parental
responsibilities. 45
II. OVERRIDING THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT
As with all rights, the right to refuse medical treatment has its lim-
its. Different jurisdictions employ different standards and legal tests to
determine whether and how the State may force involuntary medical
treatment on a pregnant woman. In some jurisdictions, a threat to the
fetus will almost completely nullify the woman's right to refuse medical
treatment.46 For example, in Georgia the court actually allowed the State
to obtain legal custody over the fetus while it was inside the mother's
body.47 Other jurisdictions will defer to the mother's decision in all but
the most exigent and exceptional circumstances.48 In theory, Florida
41. Id. (quoting LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1337-38 (2d ed.
1988)).
42. Dubreui, 629 So. 2d at 826.
43. Id.
44. The Court noted that this reasoning was severely flawed due to the fact that the children's
father was alive and would be required by law to care for his children if their mother passed away.
Id. at 826.
45. Id.
46. Application of Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (Sup. Ct. 1985) ("While I
recognize that the fetus in this case is not yet viable, and that the state's interest in protecting its
life would be less than 'compelling' . . . the state has a highly significant interest in protecting the
life of a mid-term fetus, which outweighs the patient's right to refuse a blood transfusion on
religious grounds."); New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. V.M., 974 A.2d 448, 449
(App. Div. 2009) (declining to decide whether a mother's refusal of a cesarean section was
evidence of child abuse or neglect that could allow the state to terminate her parental rights).
47. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 459 (Ga. 1981).
48. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc); e.g., Davis v. Columbia
Hosp. for Women Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 91-16305 (Super. Ct. D.C. June 24, 1996) (order denying
plaintiff's motion in limine) (concluding that a doctor is not compelled to comply when a patient
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applies the strict scrutiny test, in which the State can override a pregnant
woman's right to refuse medical treatment only if it establishes a com-
pelling interest and narrowly tailored means to serve that interest.4 9
A. Jurisdictions Protecting the Fetus
Some jurisdictions resolve the conflict between the woman and
fetus in a manner that practically guarantees that the State can force
medical treatment in order to protect the fetus. The Georgia Supreme
Court considered a case where a pregnant woman declined a cesarean
section and a blood transfusion on religious grounds.5" The Georgia
Supreme Court found that the woman and the fetus were so connected
that the wellbeing of the fetus trumped the woman's right to bodily
integrity." The court reasoned that refusal of medical treatment was
analogous to criminal conduct and child neglect.52 The pregnant
woman's parental rights were temporarily terminated and transferred to
the Department of Family and Children Services. 53 The court actually
permitted a state agency to take temporary custody of a fetus while it
was inside its mother. 4 This temporary custody permitted the agency to
make the woman's medical decisions until the child was born.
B. Jurisdictions Protecting Women
Other jurisdictions will protect the woman's interest over that of the
fetus.56 In a particularly difficult case, the United States Court of
requested to terminate her high-risk pregnancy in the twenty-seventh week of pregnancy when
there was a possibility that the fetus could be born alive).
49. State v. Herbert (In re Browning), 568 So. 2d 4, 14 (Fla. 1990).
50. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 458 (Ga. 1981).
51. Id. at 458.
52. Id. at 458-59 ("To abort this child would be a criminal offense in Georgia. A viable
unborn child has the right under the U.S. Constitution to the protection of the State through such
statutes prohibiting arbitrary termination of the life of an unborn fetus .... The Court concludes
that this child is without the proper parental care and subsistence necessary for his or her physical
life and health.").
53. Id. ("Temporary custody of the unborn child is hereby granted to the State of Georgia
Department of Human Resources and the Butts County Department of Family and Children
Services. The Department shall have full authority to make all decisions, including giving consent
to the surgical delivery appertaining to the birth of this child. The temporary custody of the
Department shall terminate when the child has been successfully brought from its mother's body
into the world or until the child dies, whichever shall happen.").
54. Id.
55. Id. at 460.
56. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc); In re Brown, 294 Ill.
App. 3d 159, 171 (1997) ("We hold that the State may not override a pregnant woman's
competent treatment decision, including refusal of recommended invasive medical procedures, to
potentially save the life of the viable fetus ... and find that a blood transfusion is an invasive
medical procedure that interrupts a competent adult's bodily integrity.").
1046
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Appeals for the District of Columbia determined that the woman's deci-
sion would almost always prevail.57 In In re A.C., the State obtained a
judicial order to perform a cesarean section on a pregnant woman with
terminal cancer without her consent. 8 Despite the fact that a cesarean
section would aggravate her cancer and likely shorten her life, the judge
ordered that the woman submit to the surgery.59 The judge decided
between a terminally ill woman's inevitable death and a fetus that might
survive via cesarean section delivery.6 ° Ultimately, the doctor performed
the cesarean section.61 The baby died a few hours after the delivery.
62
The woman died two days later.6 3
The District of Columbia Circuit found that the trial court erred in
ordering the forced cesarean section.' After evaluating the common law
and federal constitutional protections of the right to refuse medical treat-
ment, the District of Columbia Circuit held that "every person has the
right, under the common law and constitution, to accept or refuse medi-
cal treatment. '65 This right exists regardless of that person's illness, and
even if her death is imminent.66 "To protect that right against intrusion
by others-family members, doctors, hospitals, or anyone else, however
well intentioned, we hold that a court must determine the patient's
wishes by any means available, and must abide by those wishes unless
there are truly extraordinary or compelling reasons to override them."67
C. Florida's Strict Scrutiny Test
Florida uses a more stringent standard that favors neither the
woman nor the fetus.68 In theory, Florida employs a strict scrutiny test to
determine whether or not the State can, and how it can, override a
woman's right to refuse medical treatment.69 The State cannot override a
57. A.C., 573 A.2d at 1252 ("What a trial court must do in a case such as this [where the
mother has not consented to treatment for the benefit of the fetus] is to determine, if possible,
whether the patient is capable of making an informed decision about the course of her medical
treatment. If she is, and if she makes such a decision, her wishes will control in virtually all
cases.").
58. Id. at 1238.
59. Id. at 1240.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1241.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1251.
65. Id. at 1247.
66. Id. ("Further, it matters not what the quality of a patient's life may be; the right of bodily
integrity is not extinguished simply because someone is ill, or even at death's door.").
67. Id.
68. State v. Herbert (In re Browning), 568 So. 2d 4, 14 (Fla. 1990); Burton v. State, 49 So.
3d. 263, 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
69. Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 at 14; Burton, 49 So. 3d. at 265.
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pregnant woman's decision to refuse medical treatment unless it demon-
strates a compelling interest and narrowly tailored means to protect that
interest. 70
Florida has identified potential compelling state interests, including
(1) preservation of life, (2) protection of innocent third parties, (3) pre-
vention of suicide,7' and (4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the med-
ical profession. 7 But the existence of any of these concerns does not
automatically guarantee that the State can impose involuntary medical
treatment upon an individual.73
[Courts have advised that] these state interests.., are by no means a
bright-line test, capable of resolving every dispute regarding the
refusal of medical treatment. Rather, they are intended merely as fac-
tors to be considered while reaching the difficult decision of when a
compelling state interest may override the basic constitutional right
of privacy .. .
Because the existence of a compelling state interest is not suffi-
cient, the State must also establish narrowly tailored means to accom-
plish this state interest.75 As the Supreme Court of Florida has held,
"[t]he means to carry out any such compelling state interest must be
narrowly tailored in the least intrusive manner possible to safeguard the
rights of the individual. 76
In addition to relying on strict scrutiny as the doctrinal standard, the
Florida Supreme Court has devised a specific procedure to use when an
individual's refusal of medical treatment may compromise a compelling
state interest.77 The healthcare provider contacts the State Attorney, who
70. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14 ("The means to carry out any such compelling state interest
must be narrowly tailored in the least intrusive manner possible to safeguard the rights of the
individual.").
71. The refusal of medical treatment that would result in death is permitted, id. at 10, the
Florida Supreme Court has included this as a factor that would allow the State to override the right
to refuse medical treatment. The Florida Supreme Court has used this factor to find that there is no
right to assisted suicide. Krischer v. McIver, 697 So. 2d 97, 100 (Fla. 1997).
72. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14 ("Cases decided by this Court have identified state interests in
the preservation of life, the protection of innocent third parties, the prevention of suicide, and
maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession, and have balanced them against an
individual's right to refuse medical treatment.").
73. Id.
74. Singletarry v. Costello, 665 So. 2d 1099, 1105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
75. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 824 (Fla. 1993) ("Accordingly, a health care provider
wishing to override a patient's decision to refuse medical treatment must immediately provide
notice to the State Attorney presiding in the circuit where the controversy arises, and to interested
third parties known to the health care provider. The extent to which the State Attorney chooses to
engage in a legal action, if any, is discretionary based on the law and facts of each case. This
procedure should eliminate needless litigation by health care providers while honoring the
1048 [Vol. 67:1039
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decides whether or not to pursue the judicial order.78 The State Attorney
may appoint the hospital's retained attorney as special counsel.79 A
judge will hold a hearing and determine if a compelling state interest
exists and if narrowly tailored means can be used to achieve it.80 If the
judge finds a compelling state interest, he may order narrowly tailored
involuntary medical treatment to protect that compelling state interest.'I
In short, Florida requires that the State demonstrate a compelling
interest-a risk of harm to the viable fetus-and use narrowly tailored
means to protect the fetus before a court will compel involuntary medi-
cal treatment of a pregnant woman.82
III. FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY PROTECT A PREGNANT WOMAN'S
RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT
Despite the demanding requirements of the strict scrutiny test, Flor-
ida courts continually fail to protect a pregnant woman's right to refuse
medical treatment. First, many courts do not actually apply the strict
scrutiny test. Second, reviewing courts often perform a limited and sub-
standard review of cases involving pregnant women when compared
with the searching and thorough appellate review of other cases of invol-
untary medical treatment. Third, although judicial proceedings to impose
compulsory medical treatment endanger a woman's physical liberty, the
State fails to provide needed legal counsel despite an obligation to do so.
A. Doctrinal Failure to Apply Strict Scrutiny
Florida courts have consistently failed to apply the strict scrutiny
test. A court has ordered compulsory medical treatment without even
determining that the fetus is viable 83-when viability is the threshold
requirement for the State's compelling interest in the fetus.8 4 Judges
have also compelled involuntary treatment without finding particular
risks posed to the fetus.85 Indeed, where the reviewing court did explain
the risks posed to the fetus, the court insisted that the State had a com-
pelling interest even when there was only a two to six percent chance of
patient's wishes and giving other interested parties the right to intervene if there is a good faith
reason to do so.").
78. Id.
79. Wevers, supra note 1, at 436.
80. Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d at 824.
81. Id.
82. Singletarry v. Costello, 665 So. 2d 1099, 1105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
83. Burton v. State, 49 So. 3d 263, 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
84. Id.; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
85. Burton, 49 So. 3d at 265.
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fatal injury to the fetus.8 6
1. COURTS HAVE NOT REQUIRED A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST
Florida courts have not applied strict scrutiny to cases of compel-
ling forced medical treatment of pregnant women because the judicial
orders and reviewing decisions fail to establish the viability of the fetus,
specific danger to the fetus, or substantial risk of injury, without which
the State cannot claim to have a compelling interest.
In Burton v. State, the trial judge failed to establish a compelling
state interest because he made no finding that the fetus was even via-
ble.87 Florida defines viability as the point at which a fetus could survive
outside of the mother's womb with artificial support.88 In Florida, there
is no presumption that a third trimester fetus is viable.8 9 The judicial
order compelling Ms. Burton to do everything the doctor told her did not
state that the fetus was viable.9" Thus, the court did not even determine
if an innocent third party (i.e., a viable fetus) entitled to legal protection
existed.9' The appellate court found that the trial court's failure to deter-
mine fetal viability was error.92
The trial court in Burton also failed to explain how the mother's
behavior placed the fetus at risk.93 The court merely stated that the
mother's failure to follow medical instructions placed the fetus in "'sub-
stantial and unacceptable risk' of severe injury or death." 94 The lower
court provided no indication of what risks were posed to the fetus or
how the mother's behavior exacerbated those risks.95 The judge failed to
make any finding that explained how the mother's behavior placed the
fetus at risk and resulted in a compelling need for the State to protect the
fetus. 96 Essentially, the trial court allowed a conclusory statement to sat-
isfy strict scrutiny.
86. Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1253 (1999).
87. Burton, 49 So. 3d at 265.
88, FLA. STAT. § 390.011(4) (2006) (" 'Viability' means that stage of fetal development when
the life of the unborn child may with a reasonable degree of medical probability be continued
indefinitely outside the womb.").
89. Id.; Burton, 49 So. 3d at 265 (holding that a compelling interest in a fetus does not exist
until there is a finding that the fetus is viable and Florida does not recognize any presumption that
a fetus is viable).
90. Burton, 49 So. 3d at 265.
91. Id. (holding that a compelling interest in a fetus does not exist until there is a finding that
the fetus is viable and Florida does not recognize any presumption that a fetus is viable); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1989) (noting that the State has a compelling interest in a viable fetus).
92. Burton, 49 So. 3d at 265.
93. Id. at 264.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 265.
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The Burton trial court also failed to address the basic question of
whether the forced medical treatment had any chance of success. The
court provided no explanation of the risks and benefits of the proposed
medical treatment.97 For example, does a fetus usually survive a
cesarean section at this stage in a high-risk pregnancy? Is there a high
likelihood that the fetus will survive but will also suffer severe brain
damage? Or rather, was the fetus likely to be stillborn regardless of the
delivery method? The trial court left all of these questions unanswered.98
Even after complying with monitored bed rest, enduring a forced
cesarean section, and following all of the doctor's orders, the mother
gave birth to a stillborn fetus. 99 Further, the reviewing appellate court
did not mention these crucial missing elements." °° This perhaps indi-
cates that a determination of viability will satisfy strict scrutiny and per-
mit the involuntary treatment of a pregnant woman, in complete
contradiction of the Supreme Court of Florida. 1 '
In contrast to the limited information in the Burton case, Pemberton
v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center demonstrates that a
specific finding of risk or danger to the fetus should not necessarily war-
rant forced medical treatment. 0 2 In Pemberton, the court concluded that
an involuntary cesarean section was necessary to protect the fetus
because the risk of death to the fetus was, considering all facts in the
light most favorable to the State, six percent. 0 3 Ms. Pemberton had pre-
viously undergone a cesarean section with a vertical incision, a method,
which apparently leads to a greater risk of uterine rupture, which could
result in the fetus's death. 1" The court, however, inadvertently called its
own finding into question when it specifically noted that "[a]fter a
cesarean section of the type Ms. Pemberton previously had undergone
... it is possible for a woman to deliver vaginally without uterine rup-
97. Id. This could be due, in part, to the sparse record from the lower court, which left many
questions unanswered. Id. at 268 n. 2.
98. Id. at 265.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 264-65.
101. The Supreme Court of Florida explained that the existence of concerns regarding (1)
preservation of life, (2) prevention of suicide, (3) protection of innocent third parties, and (4)
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession, may indicate the existence of a
compelling state interest, but that any one of these concerns in and of itself is insufficient to
establish a compelling state interest. Singletarry v. Costello, 665 So. 2d 1099, 1105 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1996) ("These state interests ... are by no means a bright-line test, capable of resolving
every dispute regarding the refusal of medical treatment. Rather, they are intended merely as
factors to be considered while reaching the difficult decision of when a compelling state interest
may override the basic constitutional right of privacy ....").
102. Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1253 (N.D.
Fla. 1999).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1249.
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ture or other complications.""1 5 Thus, the court recognized that it was
possible for Ms. Pemberton to vaginally deliver a healthy child without
any complications. Indeed, the court's statistics game indicated that
there was at least a ninety-four percent probability that a vaginal birth
would not cause any injury to the fetus. 10 6
The Pemberton court justified involuntary medical treatment based
on the premise that no one would participate in an activity that presents
a four-to-six percent risk of death.'0 7 The State's most favorable evi-
dence was expert medical testimony, which stated that the risk of uterine
rupture and therefore death of the fetus was four to six percent.'0 8 The
court concluded that the risk of injury to the fetus was unreasonable
because "if an airline told prospective passengers there was a four to six
percent chance of a fatal crash, nobody would board the plane."' 0 9 The
court rejected Ms. Pemberton's expert who placed the risk of uterine
rupture at 2% to 2.2%, with a 50% chance of death to the fetus. "0 Con-
tinuing its airplane analogy, the court reasoned that the involuntary
cesarean section was permissible because "[p]resumably there would
still be no passengers on a plane if the risk of a crash was only two
percent, and if, in any crash, only half of the passengers would die."''
Ironically, the court reasoned that no one would fly if there were a
two percent risk of death involved in flying, but, then ordered inpatient
medical treatment, where there is a two percent chance of death by
infection. "12 Because the court reasoned that no one would participate in
an activity with a two percent risk of death, but then ordered the plaintiff
to remain in a hospital where she faced a two percent risk of contracting
a deadly infection, the court's reasoning was-and remains-flawed.
Any medical procedure has its risks and possible complications." 3
Although the court briefly alluded to these risks in a footnote, the foot-
note stated merely that there are risks associated with all medical proce-
dures and that the risks accompanying cesarean sections are less than the
risks accompanying vaginal delivery."' The court did not provide fur-
ther details on the risks associated with cesarean sections. 115 Rather, the
105. Id. at 1252-53.
106. Id.





112. Tara Parker Pope, How Scared Should We Be?, N.Y. TMIEs (Oct. 31, 2007) http://well.
blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/31/how-scared-should-we-be/.





court insisted that society pay no attention to the forced invasive surgery
behind the curtain. 1 6 A conclusory statement as to the relative risks
incidental to cesarean section and vaginal birth does not satisfactorily
explain the court's determination that a mother should face the risks
inevitably associated with involuntary surgery rather than the risks asso-
ciated with traditional vaginal birth.
In point of fact, there are serious specific risks associated with
cesarean sections. Depending on the circumstances, the risk to the
mother's life can be four to five times greater than it is through vaginal
birth." 7 The mother faces immediate risks from the surgical process,
including anesthesia complications, excessive blood loss, bladder injury,
and infection. 18 This medical procedure may also cause long-term latent
injury including uterine scarring from the uterus rupturing during subse-
quent pregnancy, which can result in death or serious injury to the
woman. 
1 19
The reasoning in Pemberton is also flawed because the mother did
not face a two-to-six percent chance of death; rather, purportedly, the
fetus did.'2 ° Where can courts defensibly draw the line and decide that a
woman's decision is trumped by the risk posed to the fetus? May a court
conclude that a pregnant woman cannot participate in any activity that
poses a two to six percent risk of death to the fetus? The risk of death
posed by the flu is about two percent;' 2 ' should a woman not be allowed
to leave her home during flu season because it presents a risk of death to
the fetus? Suppose a woman wants to go on a church mission to a devel-
oping country with a substandard healthcare system; could the court say
she cannot do that because it heightens the risk of injury to the fetus?
May a court determine that a woman cannot care for her other young
children because they are so rambunctious that she could injure the fetus
while attempting to play with them? Could a court go as far as to say
that she cannot climb or descend stairs? Finding the compelling interest
requirement satisfied based solely on a small risk to the fetus greatly
increases the range of behavior that courts could potentially curtail.
2. COURTS HAVE NOT REQUIRED NARROWLY TAILORED MEANS
Even assuming the risk to the fetus is high enough to create a com-
116. Id.
117. Eric M. Levine, Comment, The Constitutionality of Court-Ordered Cesarean Surgery: A
Threshold Question, 4 ALS. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 229, 238-40 (1994).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med'l Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1250 (N.D.
Fla. 1999).
121. Pope, supra note 112.
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pelling state interest, the means that courts have permitted are not nar-
rowly tailored enough. In other words, the courts have also failed to
apply the strict scrutiny test by compelling women to do whatever their
doctors say, issuing orders without any expiration date, deciding arbi-
trarily which type of involuntary bodily invasion a woman would prefer,
and using a woman's desire to have a child to justify compulsory medi-
cal treatment.
In Burton, the lower court's order was the opposite of narrowly
tailored.'22 Rather, the judicial order required Ms. Burton to comply
with the physician's orders, "including but not limited to bed rest, medi-
cation to postpone labor and prevent or treat infection, and eventual per-
formance of a cesarean section delivery. 123 The court ordered the
woman to do everything the doctor ordered. 24 The only limit to the
doctor's control was that his orders must promote the wellbeing of the
fetus.'25 The appellate court did not address the specifics of Ms. Bur-
ton's case at all.' 26 Instead, the appellate court stated the generic rule
that the means must be narrowly tailored to accomplish the state's com-
pelling interest, but failed to address the lower court's egregious failure
to require narrowly tailored means.' 27 The judicial order literally
required Ms. Burton to follow all the doctor's orders.'2 8 Requiring one
person to do whatever another person says cannot constitute narrowly
tailored means. The appellate court, however, failed to mention this glar-
ing error in its opinion.
Furthermore, the Burton order did not have an expiration: 129 The
child could have been born and Ms. Burton would still have been
required to follow the doctor's orders. In the Burton case, the fetus was
stillborn but was still delivered by cesarean section. 130 There is no indi-
cation that the judicial order would not apply if it became extremely
unlikely that the fetus would survive. 3' In fact, the judicial order was
not actually rescinded until one day after the fetus was delivered still-
born.132 The appellate court should have addressed the nearly nonexis-
122. Burton v. State, 49 So. 3d 263, 264 (2010).
123. Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 265.
127. Id.
128. Id. ("The court ordered Samantha Burton to comply with the physician's orders
'including, but not limited to' bed rest, medication to postpone labor and prevent or treat infection,







tent likelihood that this never-ending judicial order to follow the
doctor's orders ad infinitum could qualify as narrowly tailored and thus
be constitutional.
The court relied on a disturbing rationale in Pemberton to provide a
reason why a forced cesarean section is narrowly tailored: specifically, a
woman's desire to have a child.'33 The court justified an involuntary
cesarean section on the presumption that requiring a woman to have a
wanted child by cesarean section is less of a burden on the woman than
requiring a woman to have an unwanted child.'34
The balance tips far more strongly in favor of the state in the case at
bar, because here the full-term baby's birth was imminent, and more
importantly, here the mother sought only to avoid a particular proce-
dure for giving birth, not to avoid giving birth altogether. Bearing an
unwanted child is surely a greater intrusion on the mother's constitu-
tional interests than undergoing a cesarean section to deliver a child
that the mother affirmatively desires to deliver.'35
The court is in no position to determine if bearing an unwanted
child is a greater burden than undergoing an involuntary cesarean sec-
tion. A cesarean section is a serious surgery that cuts through multiple
layers of tissues, physically removes a fetus from a person's body, and
usually leaves a permanent scar. 136 There are some women who have an
unexpected pregnancy but do not want an abortion. A woman may
choose against abortion because of religious beliefs, personal reasons,
etc. Some of these women, however, often because of religious beliefs,
do not want surgery. 137 The court is in no position to make a bright-line
determination that an unwanted pregnancy is a greater burden than
involuntary surgery.
The court's reasoning in Pemberton is also flawed because it seems
to be based on the assumption that the woman had a choice whether or
not to have the child. It did not matter after the point of viability if Ms.
Pemberton had not wanted the child.13' This case exists because the
State of Florida sought to ensure that the viable fetus would be born
healthy. 39 Because Ms. Pemberton's desire to have or not have the child
133. Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1251 (N.D.
Fla. 1999).
134. Id.
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. Levine, supra note 117, at 236.
137. April L. Cherry, The Free Exercise Rights of Pregnant Women Who Refuse Medical
Treatment, 69 TENN. L. Rav. 563, 564 (2002).
138. FLA. STATE § 390.0111(1) (2006) ("No termination of pregnancy shall be performed on
any human being in the third trimester of pregnancy [unless necessary to save the pregnant
woman's life.").
139. Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1251.
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is irrelevant, it is inappropriate to justify unwanted medical treatment on
that basis.
Most concerning is that the Pemberton court used a woman's desire
to have her child against her as means to justify violating her bodily
integrity. Ms. Pemberton had taken her pregnancy and childbirth seri-
ously. 4 ° She did not want a cesarean section, and because doctors
would not comply with that wish, she hired a qualified midwife to assist
with a homebirth.' 4 ' Thus, the court used her manifest desire to have a
successful childbirth against her to force her to bear a child using a pro-
cedure contrary to her wishes.' 42 If the court's reasoning is followed to
its logical conclusion, a woman who had an unexpected pregnancy and
did not seriously desire to have the child, e.g., did not go to the doctor
regularly, drank excessive amounts of alcohol, etc., would be in a better
position to assert her right to bodily integrity. The inevitable result of
that reasoning is that of two women, who would both ultimately be
required to have the child, assuming the fetus is viable and birth is immi-
nent, the one who has done more to ensure the wellbeing of the fetus
loses her right to bodily integrity.
By ordering a pregnant woman to do everything she was told, the
lower and appellate courts in Burton blatantly ignored the narrowly tai-
lored means requirement. 143 Although the Pemberton court attempted to
explain the narrowly tailored means requirement, its deeply flawed rea-
soning ultimately resulted in the court deciding that the method of birth
is an unimportant concern for pregnant women' and that a woman's
desire to have a child can constitute grounds for the permissible viola-
tion of her bodily integrity.
B. Substandard Appellate Review
In most cases involving involuntary medical treatment, reviewing
courts perform in-depth and searching review.14 However, in cases
involving pregnant women, not only have the courts failed to apply the
standard doctrinal test, but appellate courts have limited their review to
140. Id. at 1248 (noting that Ms. Pemberton hired a midwife and took steps to prepare for an
at-home vaginal delivery).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1251.
143. Burton v. State, 49 So. 3d 263, 264 (2012).
144. If this statement were true, then this case would not have been before the court.
145. See State v. Herbert (In re Browning), 568 So. 2d 4, 9 (Fla. 1990) (examining medical
evidence, causation, and likelihood of successful treatment); In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 372 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (permitting parents to remove the feeding tube of their permanently brain




broad procedural issues.14 6 Indeed, appellate judges have indicated that
they may use the mootness doctrine to avoid hearing cases involving the
involuntary medical treatment of pregnant women.14 7
In M.N. v. Southern Baptist Hospital, the appellate court remanded
an order of compelled chemotherapy to be administered to an eight-
month-old child on the basis that the trial court failed to consider the
nature of the treatment, the likelihood of success, and the parents' inter-
est. 148 The parents opposed the treatment because of religious beliefs
and due to a concern that the treatment would cause the child undue
suffering.1 49 The appellate court held that the child's welfare and par-
ents' interest in the child extended beyond compulsory futile treatment:
There is a substantial distinction in the State's insistence that a
human life be saved where the affliction is curable, as opposed to the
State's interest where ... the issue is not whether, but when, for how
long, and at what cost to the individual . . . life may be briefly
extended. 50
The appellate court in M.N. remanded with instructions that the
lower court complete an in-depth review of individual circumstances.
15 1
Specifically, the lower court was ordered to consider the parents' inter-
est, the State's interest, and the child's interest in light of the severity of
the illness, the likelihood of success, and the invasiveness of the treat-
ment. 152 In the court's own words:
This necessitates consideration of the appellants' interest in making
fundamental decisions regarding the care of their minor child, the
state's interest in preserving human life, and the child's own welfare
and best interests, in light of the severity of the child's illness, the
likelihood as to whether the proposed treatment will be effective, the
child's chances of survival with and without such treatment, and the
invasiveness and nature of the treatment with regard to its effect on
the child. 153
In contrast, appellate review of the involuntary medical treatment
146. See Burton v. State, 49 So. 3d 263, 264-66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (ignoring the trial
court's failure to use narrowly tailored means).
147. Id. at 267-68 (Berger, J., dissenting) ("[Slince the principles of law to be applied in this
case are not new and the case is now moot, I would dismiss the appeal.").
148. 648 So. 2d 769, 771 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
149. Id. at 770.
150. Id. at 771.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. For additional examples of more searching review, see In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365,
372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the State's asserted interest in preserving life does not
trump the parents' interest in refusing medical treatment of a comatose infant lacking 90% of his
brain functioning and with less than two years to live).
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of pregnant women has often not addressed the merits of the case.' 54
Rather, the review is limited to general procedural issues.155 In Burton,
the appellate court addressed only the fact that the lower court applied
the wrong standard.' 56 It did not address the lower court's order to fol-
low all of the doctor's orders. 157 The appellate court also failed to point
out the lower court's failure to evaluate the likelihood of the treatment's
success or any potential injury to the mother or fetus. 58 Because the
fetus was stillborn despite the forced medical treatment, 159 it may have
been extremely unlikely that the fetus would have survived cesarean sec-
tion or vaginal delivery. Similarly, in Harrell v. St. Mary's Hospital, the
court held that a hospital does not have standing to request a judicial
order to compel a pregnant woman to accept a blood transfusion. 60 It
did not address whether it was permissible to order an involuntary blood
transfusion that conflicted with the pregnant woman's religious
beliefs. 161
Most concerning, the Burton case indicated that Florida appellate
courts might refuse to hear the merits of cases involving the involuntary
medical treatment of pregnant women. 162 In Burton, the court explained
that review was granted because it was a case of first impression. 63
Thus, at least one Florida appellate court has indicated that it may not
hear other cases of involuntary medical treatment of pregnant women. 164
If its justification for hearing Ms. Burton's case were extended, this
appellate court would decline to hear any future case in which the lower
court nominally applied the strict scrutiny test 65 and ordered involun-
tary medical treatment of a pregnant woman. Because of the immediacy
with which the judicial treatment orders are followed, nearly all of these
cases would be rendered moot before the mother could seek appellate
154. Burton v. State, 49 So. 3d 263, 264-66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
155. Id.; In Pemberton, the trial court did an acceptably detailed review of the facts, but its
reasoning and its application of strict scrutiny were still questionable. See supra text
accompanying notes 102-121.
156. Burton, 49 So. 3d at 264 (noting that the trial court required only that the welfare of the




160. Harrell v. St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., 678 So. 2d 455, 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
161. Id.
162. Burton, 49 So. 3d at 264.
163. Id.. But see id. at 268 (Berger, J., dissenting) (contending that this was not a case of first
impression) (citing Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247
(N.D. Fla. 1999)).
164. Id.
165. Due to the failure to apply strict scrutiny as previously discussed, exactly what will
qualify as passing the strict scrutiny test is unclear. See supra text accompanying notes 87-143.
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review.166 Thus, if the appellate court refused to hear later cases similar
to the one presented by Ms. Burton simply because they were not cases
of first impression, no other case concerning the involuntary medical
treatment of pregnant women would be heard.
Furthermore, the dissent in Burton presents an even more dis-
turbing proposition: Where the record is insufficient, the appellate court
must presume that the lower court made the correct decision. 167 The
dissent states that "[d]ue to the lack of an adequate record, we must
presume there was sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's deci-
sion, e.g., that viability was determined."1 68 Given that these cases are
often fast-paced and characterized by inadequate counsel and judicial
error, this would result in horribly-reasoned cases never being subjected
to meaningful review. For example, the Burton case involved a judge
who did not find that the fetus was viable, did not explain what risks
were posed to the mother, applied the wrong legal test, and ordered a
woman to do anything the doctor told her to do.1 69 According to the
dissent, an appellate court should not review these blatant errors. 17° By
the dissent's logic, a judge who keeps an inadequate record and does not
explain his reasoning shields himself from appellate review.
C. Failure to Provide Counsel in Forced Medical
Treatment Proceedings
The faulty reasoning and inadequate protection mechanisms in
these cases may be explained by the fact that the pregnant women are
often unrepresented by counsel. While the State appoints experienced
attorneys who then offer the testimony of medical expert witnesses, the
woman often represents herself without the assistance of counsel. Thus,
the judicial proceeding features a trained lawyer and doctor against a
woman with no formal legal or medical knowledge. Under federal and
Florida law, however, the State should provide counsel in these types of
cases. 171
166. Wevers, supra note 1 at 436 (cesarean section was performed two days after the judicial
order was granted); Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1250 (cesarean section was performed
immediately after the judicial order was granted).
167. Burton, 49 So. 3d at 267-68 (Berger, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 268 n. 2.
169. Id. at 265-66 (majority opinion).
170. Id. at 268 (Berger, J., dissenting) ("Because I disagree with the majority view that this is a
case capable of repetition yet evading review, I would dismiss the appeal as moot.").
171. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (concluding that deprivation of physical
liberty may trigger the right to counsel); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (holding that involuntary psychiatric treatment is a massive curtailment of liberty for a
non-incarcerated citizen); Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (considering
disproportionate levels of representation to determine if the defendant is entitled to counsel); In re
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Pregnant women have a right to counsel under the federal Constitu-
tion because involuntary medical treatment results in a deprivation of
physical liberty. 172 The United States Supreme Court has also identified
involuntary medical treatment as a constitutional violation that in and of
itself warrants the right to counsel.'73 Furthermore, the state of Florida
requires that those facing commitment to a mental healthcare facility
have a right to counsel.174 Because pregnant women in these proceed-
ings face deprivation of physical liberty and forced medical treatment,
both federal and Florida law provide that these women have a right to
counsel in these judicial proceedings.
1. FEDERAL LAW REQUIRES COUNSEL IN PROCEEDINGS WHERE AN
INDIVIDUAL MAY BE DEPRIVED OF HER PHYSICAL LIBERTY
The United States Constitution requires that the government
appoint counsel to represent indigent defendants facing criminal impris-
onment. 175 The Supreme Court has held that there is a right to appointed
counsel in any proceeding that "may end up in the actual deprivation of
a person's liberty." 176 The Court recognized that the right to counsel
"exist[s] only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses
the litigation."'' 77 But this is not limited to criminal charges: 78
We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency
which may result in commitment to an institution in which the juve-
nile's freedom is curtailed, the child and his parents must be notified
Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481, 489 (Fla. 1977) (holding that an individual facing involuntary
commitment has a right to counsel at all significant stages of the proceeding); Burton, 49 So. 3d at
266 ("[G]iven the deprivation of her physical liberty and violation of her privacy interests, the
proceeding below violated Samantha Burton's constitutional right to appointed counsel in this
case. Accordingly, I would reverse on these constitutional grounds as well." (Van Nortwick, J.,
concurring).
172. Shelton, 535 U.S. at 658.
173. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 493.
174. Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 489.
175. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
176. Shelton, 535 U.S. at 658.
177. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty. N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981).
178. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (emphasis added). The Court's decision was designed
to give juveniles the same protections afforded to adult suspects. Id. at 28-29 ("Under our
Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court .... The essential
difference between Gerald's case and a normal criminal case is that safeguards available to adults
were discarded in Gerald's case.").
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of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or
if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to
represent the child.179
Because the State's attempt to override a pregnant woman's right to
refuse medical treatment may result in a deprivation of physical liberty,
these women have the right to counsel. The risk that an individual will
be deprived of her physical liberty triggers the right to counsel.1 0 In
Pemberton, Ms. Pemberton was deprived of her physical liberty when
police arrived at her home and brought her to the hospital to receive an
involuntary cesarean section.1 8' In Burton, Ms. Burton was ordered to
remain in the hospital, submit to supervised bed rest, and follow any
other orders of the physicians.18 Ms. Burton was deprived of her physi-
cal liberty because she was forced to remain in a hospital, and even
within the hospital, she was forced to remain in her bed. 83 She was also
forced to endure a cesarean section.184 Additionally, the order's require-
ment that she follow all the doctor's instructions further diminished her
physical liberty. 85 Because in both cases the State deprived the women
of their physical liberty, these women had a right to counsel in the judi-
cial proceeding which authorized the State to curtail their physical
freedom.
2. FEDERAL LAW REQUIRES COUNSEL IN PROCEEDINGS WHERE AN
INDIVIDUAL MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVOLUNTARY
MEDICAL TREATMENT
In addition to deprivation of physical liberty, the involuntary medi-
cal treatment also justifies the woman's right to counsel. In Vitek v.
Jones, the United States Supreme Court found in a plurality opinion that
involuntary medical treatment intruded upon a prisoner's retained right
to refuse medical psychiatric treatment,t 86 even in light of the fact that
prisoners have limited constitutional rights. 87 The Court explained,
"[w]e have recognized that for the ordinary citizen, commitment to a
mental hospital produces 'a massive curtailment of liberty. "188 The
prisoner in Vitek was to be incarcerated in a prison or mental institution:
179. Id. at 41.
180. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty. N. C., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981).
181. Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1250 (N.D.
Fla. 1999).




186. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980) (plurality opinion).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 491 (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972)).
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either way his physical liberty would be deprived.'89 The plurality still
found, however, that subjecting someone to the risk of involuntary psy-
chiatric treatment without the benefit of counsel was impermissible. 90
Essentially, in addition to the deprivation of physical liberty, involuntary
medical treatment further intrudes upon an individual's rights. Thus, that
individual has the right to counsel.191
Similarly, in addition to the deprivation of their physical liberty, the
women in both Burton and Pemberton were forced to endure an involun-
tary medical procedure.192 The respective courts ordered the medical
procedure despite the fact that the women did not have the assistance of
counsel.1 93 Also, neither of these women was incarcerated; if a prisoner
has a right to counsel before involuntary medical treatment, a free
woman should as well.' 94 To conclude otherwise is to suggest that preg-
nancy deprives women of more rights than does incarceration.
3. FEDERAL LAW INDICATES A RIGHT TO COUNSEL ExISTS IN THESE
PROCEEDINGS BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THE INTERESTS
AT STAKE AND RISK OF ERRONEOUS DECISION
In addition to the presumption that deprivation of liberty confers a
right to counsel, the court considers other factors to determine if counsel
is required. 95 In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham
County North Carolina, the United States Supreme Court enumerated
three factors to consider when determining if the right to counsel exists
in non-criminal proceedings: (1) the private interests at stake, (2) the
government's interest, and (3) the risk that procedures will lead to an
erroneous decision. 196 The court also noted that the test should be
applied with the presumption that the right to counsel generally only
confers when there is a risk of deprivation to physical liberty.
All the factors identified in Lassiter indicate that the woman should
have counsel appointed to her. First, there are several private interests at
189. Id. at 484.
190. Id. at 494.
191. Id.
192. Burton v. State, 49 So. 3d 263, 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (ordering forced cesarean
section and any other necessary medical treatment to protect the fetus); Pemberton v. Tallahassee
Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1250 (1999) (ordering forced cesarean section).
193. Burton, 49 So. 3d at 266 (Van Nortwick, J., concurring); Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at
1247 (stating that Ms. Pemberton was not even present during the hearing).
194. Burton, 49 So. 3d at 264 (Van Nortwick, J., concurring); Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at
1247; cf Vitek, 445 U.S. at 491 ("We have recognized that for the ordinary citizen, commitment to
a mental hospital produces a 'massive curtailment of liberty.' ") (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405
U.S. 504, 509 (1972)).




stake: the woman's physical liberty is at stake, her interest in deciding
how she will bring a life into the world, her right to refuse an invasive
surgery, and her right to avoid the risks associated with surgery. Second,
the government's interest is limited to ensuring the safety of a viable
fetus. Because counsel could be appointed quickly, appointing counsel
does not adversely affect this interest. Third, the risk of an erroneous
decision is high because the issue involves complex medical evidence
and legal rules that have been repeatedly misapplied. 97 Because much
of the decision is based on the doctor's medical testimony, the woman
should be at least entitled to counsel that has experience questioning
expert witnesses and can indicate where the testimony and conclusions
reached are dubious. Because of demonstrated legal errors committed by
the lower courts, such as applying the wrong legal standard, pregnant
women need attorneys who can ensure that the correct legal standard
guides the decision-maker.
Although counsel is not always required in civil proceedings, dis-
proportionate levels of representation may require a right to counsel. 198
For example, in Turner v. Rogers, the Supreme Court held that counsel
is not always required in child support proceedings where the non-custo-
dial parent's failure to pay may result in imprisonment of up to one
year. 9 9 The court noted, however, that appointing counsel was inappro-
priate because the custodial parent seeking child support frequently rep-
resents herself pro se.200
Pregnant women refusing medical treatment face disproportionate
levels of representation. 01 In forced medical treatment cases, the state
attorney will usually appoint the healthcare provider's retained counsel
to handle the case.2°2 Thus, an attorney who frequently handles medical
cases represents the State.20 3 In Burton, Pemberton, and nearly all other
cases involving the involuntary medical treatment of pregnant women,
the pregnant woman is without counsel and fighting pro se against the
hospital's attorney.204 Thus, unlike Turner, it is not one unrepresented
197. See Burton, 49 So. 3d at 264; Harrell v. St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., 678 So. 2d 455, 456 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
198. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011).
199. Id. at 2518.
200. Id. at 2520.
201. Wevers, supra note 1, at 436 (noting that Ms. Burton did not have legal representation but
the State was represented by the hospital's retained attorney).
202. Id.; Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1247.
203. This arrangement also presents a potential conflict of interest. The hospital's attorney is
likely to place greater trust in the doctors and is sensitive to potential medical malpractice suits,
which may affect his representation. Wevers, supra note 1, at 437.
204. Id.
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party against another unrepresented party.20 5 Because the State's legal
counsel presents a problem of disproportionate levels of representation,
Turner would not prevent the requirement that the woman receive coun-
sel as well.
Because forced medical treatment of pregnant women encompasses
an important private interest in bodily integrity, a government interest
limited to protecting a viable fetus, and a high risk of an erroneous deci-
sion, pregnant women in these circumstances need the assistance of
counsel. Additionally, the disproportionate level of representation in
these cases exacerbates the above-mentioned interests. Finally, the
actual deprivations of physical liberty seen in these cases furthers urges
the right to counsel.
4. FLORIDA LAW REQUIRES COUNSEL IN PROCEEDINGS TO OVERRIDE
A WOMAN'S RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT
Additionally, Florida courts have recognized the right to counsel in
broader circumstances than has the United States Supreme Court.2"6
Under Florida law, an individual is entitled to due process protection and
counsel in proceedings that could result in involuntary commitment to a
mental health facility.2"7 In Florida, "[t]he subject of an involuntary civil
commitment proceeding has the right to the effective assistance of coun-
sel at all significant stages of the commitment process."2 8
Because these cases involve involuntary confinement to a health-
care facility, the women have a right to counsel under Florida law. Both
the concurrence in Burton and other Florida cases indicate that an indi-
vidual facing involuntary commitment to a healthcare facility has a right
to counsel in all determinative proceedings, i.e. proceedings in which the
commitment decision is made.20 9 This Florida caselaw is reinforced by
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Vitek v. Jones, which
205. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (noting that the mother seeking child
support was also unrepresented by counsel).
206. Pullen v. State, 802 So. 2d 1113, 1116 (Fla. 2001); FLA. CONST. art I, § 9 ("No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against
oneself.").
207. Pullen, 802 So. 2d at 1116 ("Clearly, an individual who faces involuntary commitment to
a mental health facility has a liberty interest at stake."); see Jones v. State, 611 So. 2d 577, 579
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) ("At a minimum, this due process contemplates reasonable notice, a
hearing, and the right to effective assistance of counsel at all significant stages of the
proceedings .... ).
208. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481, 489 (Fla. 1977) ("By significant stages we mean all
judicial proceedings and any other official proceeding at which a decision is, or can be, made
which may result in a detrimental change to the conditions of the subject's liberty."); e.g., Ivey v.
Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 974 So. 2d 480, 483 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
209. Burton v. State, 49 So. 3d 263, 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
1064 [Vol. 67:1039
MYTH OF PROTECTION
identifies a right to counsel in proceedings involving involuntary psychi-
atric treatment.21 ° In the cases discussed in this article, pregnant women
are involuntarily kept in a hospital and forced to receive involuntary
surgery, medication, and treatment.2 11 Because people in Florida have a
right to counsel before involuntary commitment to a healthcare facility,
pregnant women have a right to counsel before enduring forced medical
treatment in a hospital.
IV. SUGGESTIONS
A. Florida Should Defer to the Woman's Decision Instead of
Performing the Strict Scrutiny Test
The use of a strict scrutiny analysis in the case of pregnant women
undermines the protections of Florida's constitutional right to privacy.
There are many situations in which a person's refusal of medical treat-
ment or procedures would result in a risk of injury to innocent third
parties.212 This risk is not limited to pregnant women. For example, if a
child has a very rare blood type and the parent is the only available
person with that blood type, can the court order the parent to donate
blood even if that is against his or her religious beliefs? After all, a court
could reason, blood donations are relatively easy and routine and the
court is ordering only a blood donation on this one occasion, so the order
is narrowly tailored. If one's child needs a kidney and the parent is a
match, could the court order the parent to donate his kidney? After all, a
court could find, the State has a compelling interest in the child's life
and without the kidney the child will die; people live relatively normal
lives with only one kidney and because the child needs only one kidney,
the order is narrowly tailored.
Because the strict scrutiny analysis could lead to disastrous results
even when applied correctly and could undermine the constitutional
right to privacy, courts should instead defer to the mother's wishes when
it comes to these extremely personal bodily decisions.
B. Actually Apply Strict Scrutiny
Trial courts need to actually apply strict scrutiny instead of using it
in name only. First, the lower courts must explicitly state that the fetus is
viable and explain how it arrived at this conclusion. Second, the courts
210. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980) (plurality opinion).
211. Burton, 49 So. 3d at 265; Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F.
Supp. 2d 1247, 1250 (1999).
212. See In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 827 (Fla. 1993) (noting that the State may be able in
some circumstances to force a parent to accept life-saving medical treatment in order to prevent
abandonment of her children).
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must indicate that the fetus is at risk of severe injury or death because of
the mother's behavior. Third, the court should explain how the proposed
forced treatment would protect the viable fetus and why that protection
is necessary-in other words, how the proposed treatment is narrowly
tailored. The court's order should also give explicit, specific, and limited
directives. It should not use any limitless language, such as "including
but not limited to."'2 13 Finally, the court order must automatically expire
at the time of the fetus's birth or when the fetus is no longer viable.
For example, a model judicial order would be:
This court finds that the fetus in Ms. Doe is viable because the obste-
trician testified that the fetus is healthy, the expected due-date is in
one week, this is the thirtieth week of the pregnancy, and the obstetri-
cian stated that medical research suggests that a fetus in this condi-
tion is viable outside the mother's womb.
This court finds that Ms. Doe's refusal to receive a cesarean section
places the viable fetus at risk of severe injury or death because (1) the
obstetrician has testified that the fetus' position in the womb will
likely make it difficult for the fetus to receive air, (2) medical
research indicates that this risk will increase the longer the child is in
the womb, (3) there is a 75% chance that the fetus will not be able to
breathe, and (4) there is 99% likelihood that the fetus will die if the
complications manifest.
This court finds that an emergency cesarean section is narrowly tai-
lored to protect the fetus from serious injury or death because (1)
immediate removal from the womb would end the risk of loss of air
to the fetus, and (2) the fetus would be removed from the womb
immediately.
This court orders that an emergency cesarean section be performed in
the next twelve hours. This order automatically terminates upon com-
pletion of the cesarean section, birth of the child, or loss of the fetus.
C. Give Pregnant Women Notice of Potential Conflict Between
Woman and Fetus
Doctors should notify their pregnant patients that their medical
treatment decisions might be judicially overridden if these decisions
conflict with the wellbeing of the fetus. Such notice would foster trust
and communication between the patient and her doctor. If the woman is
alerted to the potential conflict early on, the doctor and patient can dis-
cuss the risk at an early stage without the doctor worrying that the longer
he takes to explain why medical treatment is necessary, the greater the
likelihood of injury to the fetus. Such communication also allows the
213. Burton, 49 So. 3d at 265.
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woman to explain her concerns to the doctor before the need for emer-
gency medical treatment arises. This could result in a woman's better
understanding of the severity of the risk to the fetus so that she may
eventually agree to a cesarean section or other course of treatment if it is
later deemed necessary. Alternatively, if a doctor learns that a woman
does not want a medical procedure because of her deeply held religious
beliefs, the doctor may choose not to seek an order compelling involun-
tary medical treatment. Ideally, notice could prevent conflict and litiga-
tion between the pregnant woman and the State.
Furthermore, even if a pregnant woman and her doctor could not
reach an understanding, prior notice would allow the woman to better
protect her right to bodily integrity. Notice alerts a woman to a potential
conflict of interest with her doctor. Because doctors may differ in opin-
ion, notice would allow the woman to choose a doctor who does not
believe a certain medical treatment is necessary or at least a doctor with
whom the woman feels more comfortable. It would also allow the
woman an opportunity to properly litigate the issue if a conflict is antici-
pated. A woman could get her own attorney and experts and ensure that
if an order were granted it would be limited to what is absolutely
necessary.
D. Appoint Counsel for Pregnant Women Facing Involuntary
Medical Treatment
The States should appoint counsel for women in these proceedings.
As previously mentioned, there are various doctrinal failures during
these proceedings. These errors could be easily addressed by appointing
counsel for pregnant women who face involuntary medical treatment.
Because these cases are somewhat rare, the expense involved in
appointing an attorney would be relatively low.
E. Require Lower Courts to Create an Adequate Record
Lower courts should be required to give detailed explanations of
their findings so that appellate courts can perform a thorough and ade-
quate review.2  A complete record will enable the reviewing court to
understand the reasoning that led to an invasion of the woman's bodily
integrity. The reviewing court could then provide better instruction and
guidance to the lower courts. Additionally, requiring the lower court to
214. See M.N. v. S. Baptist Hosp. of Fla., Inc., 648 So. 2d 769, 771 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(requiring additional evidence of likelihood of success of proposed treatment, invasiveness of the
treatment, and chances of survival without proposed treatment before deciding that the State could
prevent the parents of a terminally ill child from discontinuing life support).
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compile an adequate record would also force the court to thoroughly
examine the evidence before compelling medical treatment.
At the very least, an inadequate record should not result in unwar-
ranted deference to the trial court.2"5 Reviewing courts should note this
failure by trial courts in order to discourage incomplete records and
unfounded decisions in the future. Due to the hasty nature of these pro-
ceedings, it is unfair to assume correctness based on the trial court's
failure to compile an adequate record. Reviewing courts should not
reward the trial court for this failure.
F. Perform Adequate Appellate Review
The reviewing courts must look beyond general procedural issues
and actually examine the application of strict scrutiny in these cases. As
discussed previously, other cases involving involuntary medical treat-
ment go into great detail and individualized review. Because the same
strict scrutiny test applies to pregnant women and all other persons fac-
ing forced medical treatment, pregnant women should receive the same
level of review.2" 6 The ideal appellate review would explain and confirm
the existence of a compelling state interest and of narrowly tailored
means.
Additionally, reviewing courts should note any failures by the
lower courts, even if these failures qualify as harmless error, in order to
instruct lower courts in future cases. Because these cases are usually
moot by the time they reach the appellate level, appellate opinions con-
cerning involuntary medical treatment of pregnant women are most use-
ful as guides for future cases. A failure to provide an expiration to the
order compelling treatment may not be a crucial issue in a case where a
cesarean section was performed immediately. But in a case where a
woman is involuntarily confined in a hospital for over a week, the lack
of an expiration date could play an important role in determining if the
order constituted narrowly tailored means. By addressing all significant
errors in a lower court's handling of a case the reviewing court can pre-
vent future erroneous decisions and practices in the lower courts.
215. Burton v. State, 49 So. 3d 263, 267-68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (Berger, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 266 ("The test to overcome a woman's right to refuse medical intervention in her
pregnancy is whether the state's compelling state interest is sufficient to override the pregnant
woman's constitutional right to the control of her person, including her right to refuse medical
treatment. . . . [Tihe state must then show that the method for pursuing that compelling state
interest is 'narrowly tailored in the least intrusive manner possible to safeguard the rights of the




Despite a clearly and repeatedly articulated standard to determine
the limited legality of involuntary medical treatment, Florida courts have
deviated from this standard seemingly only in cases involving pregnant
women. Where the interests of pregnant women and the fetus may con-
flict, Florida courts permit involuntary medical treatment without a find-
ing that the fetus faces substantial risk, without specified narrowly
tailored means to protect the fetus, and without meaningful review of
these decisions. These flawed judicial orders are likely the result of an
unequal playing field: a pregnant woman without counsel versus the
State's appointed attorney specialized in medical litigation.
These judicial failures can lead to ramifications limiting the rights
of pregnant women and other persons. For pregnant women, these deci-
sions signal that a limited or vague risk to the fetus can be used to limit a
woman's behavior, perhaps even beyond medical treatment decisions.
For the rest of society, these decisions undermine the strict scrutiny anal-
ysis requiring a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored means
that courts must use to compel medical treatment in all manner of cases.
Specifically, these decisions provide justifications for involuntary medi-
cal treatment of one person for the benefit of another. These cases may
ultimately water down the strict scrutiny standard, a result that could
affect any area of Florida law that uses the strict scrutiny analysis.
The Florida courts have failed to apply the law equally to all citi-
zens. " ' Although the strict scrutiny test is questionable in this context,
the failure to apply this test leaves pregnant women without any protec-
tion of their rights to refuse medical treatment. While the law of some
jurisdictions leaves pregnant women with curtailed rights, Florida courts
have chosen to simply ignore the law when it comes to pregnant women.
217. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 79 (1981) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution requires that the government treat similarly situated people alike).
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